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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeal has jurisdiction in this case 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Should this Court overturn a jury verdict when the 
evidence presented by Uintah County supports the verdict, the 
Appellants put on no evidence to rebut the testimony presented 
by Uintah County and the Appellants fail to marshal the 
evidence in support of the verdict? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Appellants must marshal all the evidence supporting 
the jury verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is 
insufficient when viewed in support of the jury verdict. 
Brookside Mobile Home Park v. Peebles, 48 P.3d 968 130 (Utah 
2002). 
2. Should the Court, change the case law and ignore the 
language of the statute, by requiring owner consent in 
determining if a road has been dedicated to the public? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This issue is a question of law which the court reviews 
for correctness. Bishop v. Gentec, Inc., 48 P.3d 218, 18 (Utah 
2002). 
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3. Does a party preserve the right to challenge a jury 
instruction when a party consents to the instruction prior to 
it being read to the jury and the instruction is accurate and 
supported by the testimony? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This is an issue of law which is reviewed for 
correctness. Bishop v. Gentec, Inc., 48 P.3d 218, 58 (Utah 
2002). 
4. Is the trial court required to receive documents as 
exhibits when there is no foundation presented for the 
document, and the documents are not relevant? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Rulings on admissibility of evidence present issues of 
law, which are reviewed for correctness. Bishop v. Gentec, 
Inc., 48 P.3d 218, IS (Utah 2002). 
5. Did the trial court err by refusing Appellant's 
request to place size restrictions on vehicles using a public 
road after the case was concluded and when the requested 
restrictions were not plead, were not part of the issues 
presented to the jury and no evidence on that issue was 
presented at trial? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This issue is a question of law which the court reviews 
for correctness. Bishop v. Gentec, Inc., 48 P.3d 218, 18 (Utah 
2002) 
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6. Should Appellants be ordered to reimburse Uintah 
County for the attorney' s fees incurred on appeal pursuant to 
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure? 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §72-5-104(1): 
A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of 
the public when it has been continuously used as a 
public thoroughfare for a period of ten years. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 29, 1999, Plaintiffs, Chapmans and Harmston 
(herein referred to as "Chapmans") filed a Complaint asking 
the Court to determine that a road which crosses the 
Plaintiffs' property was not a public road. Uintah County 
filed its Answer and Counterclaim alleging that the road had 
been dedicated to the public pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §72-5-
104. A jury trial was held September 4 and 5, 2001. The jury 
found that the road was a public road finding that it had been 
used by the public from 1960 through 1998. (Addendum 5 & 7) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The road in question is referred to as the North 
Wyaskett Bottom Road. T. 10 (referred to herein as Road) The 
Road travels along the East side of the Green River from a 
point where State Road 88 crosses the Green River at Ouray and 
then the Road connects with other roads that either go to 
Vernal or the oil field South of Vernal. The Road traverses 
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mainly public lands and also crosses property owned by 
Plaintiffs. Exhibit 1. 
2. The Chapmans' predecessors, in 1956, homesteaded 
part of the land through which the Road travels. At the time 
the Chapmans' property was homesteaded the Road already 
existed. T. 292 
3. At trial, Uintah County called several witnesses to 
testify regarding the use of the Road by the public. Chapmans 
did not call any witnesses or rebut any of the testimony. 
4. Gilbert Brough testified that in 1929 he was born 
in the area where the Road was located, and that he often 
traveled the Road throughout his lifetime of over 70 years. 
He recalled using the Road in the 1930's and 1940 fs, even 
before the Chapmans' property was homesteaded (T: 39-40). He 
remembered taking his pickup along the Road to Johnson Bottoms 
to fish in the 1940's and during that time period saw a lot of 
others also using the Road (T: 41-43). 
5. Mr. Brough worked for an oilfield service company, 
Schlumberger, beginning in 1954. He testified that he often 
used the Road to return to Vernal from the oilfield because it 
was a shorter route and he considered it to be a public road 
(T: 46-47). He used the Road as often as 5 or 6 times per 
month (T: 47). When he traveled the Road during the 1950's, 
he saw lots of oilfield traffic on the Road as well as 
4 
hunters. Mr. Brough was then transferred to Colorado for a 
time period and in 1966 he returned to Vernal. Upon his 
return to Vernal he continued to use the Road for travel to 
his assignments in the oilfield. He testified that the Road 
had been improved since he used it in the 1950!s and that he 
continued to use the Road from 1966 through 1987 for travel to 
and from the oilfield in his employment with Schlumberger. 
(T:52) Mr. Brough further testified that since his retirement 
he used the Road for recreational purposes in the 1990fs and 
that during that time period he has seen BLM vehicles and 
others using the Road (T54-55). 
6. Gene Nyberg, former Road Superintendent for Uintah 
County, testified that he had graded the south portion of the 
Wyaskett Bottom Road during the time periods of 1952 to 1959 
and 1965 to 1972. (T:74). He testified that when he was 
grading he would see members of the public using the Road, 
mainly oilfield related traffic. He also testified that he 
traveled the Road to get to the Red Wash oil field. Mr. 
Nyberg stated that it was a dirt-graded Road, that he did not 
recall ever seeing any gates on the Road and never sought 
permission to use the Road (T:78,86). 
7. Daniel Alonso, the manager of the Ouray Wildlife 
Refuge which is mainly located across the Green River from the 
Road, testified that the Refuge was established in May of 1960 
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(T:92) and that it is adjacent to the Road. He testified that 
since his involvement as the manager he has seen a lot of 
traffic on the Road including, oilfield traffic, hunters, 
fishers, and government workers, bird watchers, wildlife 
photographers and others. (T:94,98). He further testified 
that the refuge has maintained the Road for approximately 17 
years (T:100,101). The only gate that he is familiar with is 
a gate Chapmans installed that started this lawsuit. He 
further testified that the Road had been graded and graveled 
and that cattle guards and culverts had been put in the Road 
(T:102,103). 
8. Val Smuin testified that he had used the Road for 
over 35 years, that beginning in the 1960's he had used the 
Road to access the Green River for trapping with his 
grandfather (T:133) and that they used it often (T:135). He 
testified that it was a dirt road without any gates or fences 
to obstruct its use. He testified that in the 1970fs he used 
the Road to hunt and fish as often as three times a week 
during the winter (T:137). While he was using the Road, he 
also saw other hunters and oilfield workers traveling the 
Road. He also used the Road during the summers to fish, shoot 
prairie dogs and take his kids on outings. (T:149) At no time 
did he ever ask for permission to use the Road (T:153). 
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9. Chad Smuin testified that he has used the Road 
since the early 1980s to the present. His first memory of 
traveling the Road was when he went fishing with his father 
(T:179). He testified that beginning in the 1980fs he 
remembered using the Road every year, six to eight times per 
month in the winter and three to four times per month in the 
summer, for recreational purposes. It was a well traveled 
road and he saw other members of the public traveling the 
Road. He testified that he continues to use the Road, that it 
is a reasonably well maintained Road and at no time did he 
ever seek permission to use the Road (T:185,190). 
10. Herb Troester testified that he was the manager of 
the Ouray Wildlife Refuge from July of 1976 to August of 1983 
and that while he was there he was on the Road many times and 
that he used the Road personally for hunting (T:209-211) . He 
saw members of the public using the Road including fisherman 
and hunters. T. 209. It was a graveled road and was good 
enough he traveled it in his Volkswagen Rabbit to hunt 
pheasants. T.210. He never asked permission from anyone to 
use the Road. The only gate was one the Refuge installed to 
keep cattle off the Refuge but that road did not hinder the 
public's use of the Road. T. 211. 
11. Bret Prevedel testified that he had used the Road 
starting in either 1990 or 1991 and he used it every year 
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since for access to hunt by the Refuge (T:215). He testified 
that it was an oilfield type road without vegetation on it and 
that it was a good road when it was dry and muddy when wet 
(T:217). He further testified that he never saw any gates on 
the Road, never sought permission to use the Road, and that he 
always considered it a public road and that he had seen many 
other members of the public using the Road (T:218,219). 
12. Clay Hacking testified that he had used the Road 
for over 30 years beginning in the early 1970!s (T:241). He 
and friends had traveled there during the summer and fall for 
hunting (T:243) and saw others traveling the Road (T:243). 
The other people he saw using the Road included fish and 
wildlife officers, oilfield workers, and hunters (T:244). At 
no time did he ever seek permission and there were no gates on 
the Road (T:244). The Road was graded and there were always 
other members of the public using the Road. 
13. Gary Mecham testified that he was a heavy equipment 
operator for the Refuge and that he had maintained the Road 
since 1983 (T:253). He testified that he was on the Road 
weekly and did not ever recall being on the Road when there 
were not members of the public using the Road. Those members 
of the public included hunters, cattlemen, oilfield workers, 
stockman, fisherman, and bird watchers. He had also used it 
personally for sightseeing and hunting (T:256). There were no 
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gates on the Road. There were some cattle guards. He always 
considered the road to be a public Road and never sought 
permission to use it. (T:256). 
14. One of the representatives of the Plaintiffs, Greg 
Harmston, testified that when his father patented the property 
in the 1950fs the Road already existed (T:269). He further 
testified that neither he nor the Fredricksons, the 
predecessor to Chapmans, ever objected to the public using the 
Road (T:276). He testified that oilfield companies and the 
Refuge had maintained the Road (T:278,279). Originally two 
gates were put in for managing cattle but were taken out and 
replaced with cattle guards, with the last gate being removed 
in 1974 (T:284). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The testimony of Mr. Brough or the Smuins or Mr. 
Mecham, standing alone, support the jury's verdict. The 
cumulative testimony of 12 witnesses overwhelmingly support 
that verdict. Chapmans ignore that testimony when they 
challenge the verdict. Chapmans fail to marshal the evidence, 
rather they pick and choose the testimony that supports their 
version of the case. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) does not require owner 
consent for a Road to be abandoned and dedicated to the 
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public. The case law is consistent with that statute and 
should not be overruled. 
3. Chapmans consented to jury instructions 7 and 33 and 
therefore did not preserve the right to challenge those 
instructions on appeal. In addition, those instructions are 
accurate statements of the law and consistent with the facts. 
4. Chapmans presented no foundation nor any information 
showing that Exhibits 4 and 5 were relevant and therefore the 
trial court properly refused to admit those exhibits. 
5. The trial court acted properly in denying Chapmans 
belated request to restrict the use of the Road after the jury 
had entered its verdict when those restrictions were not pled, 
no evidence was submitted on the issue and the jury was not 
instructed on those requested restrictions. 
6. This appeal is without merit and Uintah County should 
be awarded the legal fees incurred. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE JURY VERDICT IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED AT TRIAL BY UINTAH COUNTY. CHAPMANS 
PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE TO THE JURY AND NOW FAIL TO 
MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THAT VERDICT. 
The Road had been used to access lands along the Green 
River prior to the Chapmans' property being homesteaded in the 
1930!s and 1940fs. Plaintiff, Harmston testified that the 
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Road existed when his father homesteaded the property in 1956. 
The public had unfettered use of the property until Plaintiff, 
Chapman acquired the property in 1998 and attempted to block 
the Road. When Uintah County took the position that it was a 
public road, Chapmans then filed this lawsuit asking the court 
to rule that the Wyasket Bottom Road was not a public road. 
That issue was tried to a jury on September 4 and 5, 
2001. After receiving testimony from 12 witnesses the jury 
returned a verdict finding that the Wyasket Bottom Road was a 
public road and had been used by the public from 1960 through 
1998 (1998 was when Plaintiff Chapman acquired the property 
and blocked the Road resulting in this law suit) . (Addendum 5) 
Chapman challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
the jury's verdict. 
On appeal, when challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence, Chapman has the burden to marshal the evidence in 
support of that verdict and then show the evidence is 
insufficient to support the verdict. Brookside Mobile Home 
Park v. Peebles, 48 P.3d 968 530 (Utah 2002). When the 
appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the Court will not 
consider the challenge to the jury's verdict. Smith v Smith 
995 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah App. 1999), Lefavi v Bertich 994 P.2d 
817, 821 (Utah App. 2000) and Koulis v Standard Oil Co. of 
California 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah App. 1987). Chapmans, in 
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their brief, did not marshal the evidence, but rather picked 
and chose the facts that support Chapmans' theory. The Court 
should dismiss the challenge to the jury's verdict out of 
hand. 
Nevertheless, if the Court were to consider the issue of 
sufficiency of the evidence, which was not properly briefed, 
it is clear that the verdict is more than adequately supported 
by the witnesses for the County. Utah Code Ann. §72-5-104(1) 
sets forth three elements that must be proven to show a road 
has been abandon and dedicated to the public. Those elements 
are; 1) continuous use of the road, 2) as a public 
throughfare, and 3) for a period of ten years. Campbell v. 
Box Elder County 962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1998)and Heber City 
Corp. v. Simpson 942 P.2d 307, 310 (Utah 1997). 
The testimony of many county witnesses met those 
elements. The first witness, Gilbert Brough was born in that 
area in 1929. He used the Road as a teenager with his friends 
in the 1940 fs to fish and hunt. Beginning in 1954 he used the 
Road to reach oil field well locations as part of his work for 
Schlumberger, an oil field service company. Mr. Brough 
traveled the Road five to six times a month. While on the 
Road he saw lots of other members of the public using the Road 
including other oil field traffic and recreation users. Mr. 
Brough was transferred to another area for a few years and 
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then in 1966 transferred back to Vernal. He continued to use 
the Road to reach oil field locations from 1966 to 1987 when 
he retired and even after retirement has used the Road for 
sightseeing and recreation. Mr. Brough testified that when he 
was traveling the Road he always saw other members of the 
public on the Road. Mr. Brough's testimony by itself fully 
supports the jury verdict. 
The other witnesses all agreed with and supported Mr. 
Brough. Gene Nyberg testified that he saw the public using 
the Road from 1965 to 1972 when he worked in the area grading 
the county roads. Three employees of the Ouray Wildlife Refuge 
(Dan Alonso, Herb Troester and Gary Mecham) testified that the 
Road had been used by the public to access parts of the Refuge 
since the Refuge's creation in 1960. In addition, Refuge 
employees had maintained the Road, graveled, graded and put in 
cattle guards. Mr. Mecham, a heavy equipment operator for the 
Refuge since 1983, was on the Road on at least a monthly basis 
and saw members of the public using the Road every time he 
traveled or maintained the Road. He saw oil field traffic, 
stockman, hunters, fisherman, sightseers and bird watchers, 
using the Road and had used it on a personal basis. There 
were never any signs or gates indicating the Road was not 
public until Chapman put up a gate in 1998. 
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Three hunters/fishermen (Val Smuin, Chad Smuin and Clay 
Hacking) testified as to their and other's use of the Road. 
Val Smuin had used the Road for over 35 years beginning in the 
mid 1960fs. It was a dirt road that had been improved over 
the years. He saw others using the Road and that use increased 
as the years passed. There were no gates or fences to block 
the public's use of the Road. Chad Smuin remembered using the 
Road beginning in 1980 and he had used the Road every year for 
6 to 8 times in the winter and 3 to 4 times in the summer. He 
testified that it was a descent, well traveled Road and he 
always saw others using the Road. Clay Hacking had used the 
Road since the early 1970 ?s for hunting. While on the Road he 
saw other hunters, wildlife officers and oil field traffic. 
There were no gates or signs prohibiting the use of the Road 
by the public. 
Greg Harmston testified that the Road was there when his 
father patented the property in 1956. He testified that they 
put gates on the Road in the 1950 fs to control cattle but 
removed those and replaced them with cattle guards. He 
testified that the Road was used by the public and when the 
oil field activity started the Road was used on a regular 
basis. He also testified that the Road had been maintained by 
the Refuge and oil companies. 
14 
Chapmans had the burden to marshal all the evidence and 
then show the facts would not support the jury verdict. 
Chapman, at trial put on no evidence and on appeal they have 
not marshaled the evidence but have pick certain portions of 
testimony and placed those out of context to tell Chapmans' 
version of the case. The testimony of Mr. Brough alone 
supports the verdict. The testimony of the three Refuge 
witnesses supports the verdict. The testimony of Mr. Smuin 
and Mr. Mecham support the verdict. Even the testimony of 
Plaintiff Harmston supports the verdict. When taken as a 
whole, the testimony overwhelmingly supports the verdict. 
POINT II 
NEITHER THE STATUTE NOR CASE LAW REQUIRES OWNER 
CONSENT FOR A ROAD TO BE DEDICATED AND ABANDONED TO 
THE PUBLIC. 
Plaintiffs' proposed jury instructions Nos. 5, 6, and 71 
are contrary to the language of the statute and case law. The 
i 
Chapman approved Jury Instruction No. 7. At page 314 
(Addendum 2) of the transcript the following exchange 
occurred. 
Mr. Beckwith: No. 7 had to do with the definition of 
thoroughfare, coming from Morris versus Blunt. The Court 
has accepted some of that language and rejected the rest, 
and rewritten its own instruction relative to thoroughfare. 
The Court: And you don't object to what we've done 
there? 
Mr. Beckwith: No. 
15 
statute and the case law are clear that neither consent nor 
acquiescence by the landowner is required for a road to be 
abandoned and dedicated to the public. 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 provides: 
"A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of 
the public when it has been continuously used as a 
public thoroughfare for a period of ten years/' 
Case law has established that three elements under this 
statute must be proven, (1) that the road has been used by the 
public, (2) for ten consecutive years or more as (3) a public 
thoroughfare. Heber City v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307 (Utah 1997) 
The Plaintiffs' proposed instructions numbers, 5, 6 and 7 
sought to add a fourth element of requiring the consent of the 
land owner. That argument has been rejected on several 
occasions by the Utah Appellate Courts. See Draper City v. 
Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995) pit is not necessary 
that the owner of the private road had the intent to offer the 
road to the public"); Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 
806 f.3 (Utah App. 1998)("more recent cases have definitively 
stated that owner intent is now irrelevant to determining 
whether a road has been dedicated and abandoned to public 
use"); Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 311 (Utah 
1997) ("We have subsequently abandoned interpreting into the 
language of the statute the requirement that the owner must 
consent to the dedication"); and Bertagnole v. Pine Meadow 
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Ranches, 639 P.2d 211, 213 (Utah 1981) ("There is no need to 
prove the landowner's intent".) 
To adopt Chapmans's requested instructions would require 
that the language of the statute be ignored and the overruling 
of a number of cases on the issue, which span several decades. 
The instructions given to the jury on this issue, instructions 
23 thru 28 were accurate statements of the law (Addendum 4). 
POINT III 
CHAPMANS APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 33 PRIOR TO 
THE INSTRUCTION BEING GIVEN TO THE JURY AND FAILED 
TO PRESERVE THAT INSTRUCTION ON APPEAL. 
Chapman next objects to the trial court's Jury 
Instruction No. 33 regarding gates. Chapman consented to 
Instruction No. 33, it is accurate and there were no facts 
presented at trial to support Chapmans' theory regarding 
gates. 
The issue of the impact of a gate in the Road arose 
during Chapmans' closing arguments. Even though there were no 
facts to support the argument, Chapmans' counsel argued that 
the ten year requirement could not be met because there were 
gates blocking the public's use of the Road. T. 356-357 
(Addendum 3). The trial court stopped the argument, excused 
the jury and prepared jury instruction no. 33 to address 
counsel's argument with respect to that issue. At that time, 
the following discussion took place: 
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The Court: Listen to this. "There has been 
testimony concerning certain gates across the 
Roadway at various times. Such gates may or may 
not interrupt public use of the Roadway. Whether 
the gates which were placed across the Roadway did 
in fact interrupt use by the public is an issue for 
the jury to decide." 
Mr. Beckwith: I'll accept that. 
The jury then returned and that instruction was given to 
the jury. Chapmans, rather than preserving the instruction 
for appeal, approved the instruction. If Chapmans did not 
agree with the instruction and wanted to challenge that 
instruction on appeal, Chapmans' burden was to object to the 
instruction and explain the reason for the objection. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 51. If Rule 51 is not followed, then the instruction 
can not be challenged on appeal. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 40 P. 3d 
1119, f10 and 11 (Utah 2002). In this case Chapman not only 
did not object, he approved it. 
The evidence at trial fully supports the instruction and 
the jury's determination that any alleged gate did not prevent 
the public from using the Road. The only gate that attempted 
to prevent the public using the Road was the one Chapman 
installed in 1998 that led to this lawsuit. By then the Road 
was a public road. Memmott v. Anderson, 642 P.2d 750, 753 
(Utah 1982) . Witnesses, Brough, Smuins, Previdel, Hacking and 
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Mecham all testified that there were never any gates blocking 
the public's use of the Road.2 
POINT IV 
CHAPMAN'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 9 MISSTATES THE 
LAW AND IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS. 
Chapman also complains that the Court did not give the 
proposed jury instruction no. 9 regarding seasonal use of the 
Road by hunters or fishermen with consent of the landlord. 
The trial court did give jury instruction no. 25 (Addendum 4) 
defining continuous use of the Road by the public. Neither 
the facts nor the law support the Court giving Chapman's 
proposed instruction 9. 
Chapmans cite three cases from other jurisdictions, then 
claims that Utah has not addressed seasonal use for recreation 
purposes. That is not true. Several cases in this state have 
addressed that issue and held that seasonal use is sufficient 
to create public use of the Road. Campbell v. Box Elder 
County, 962 P.2d 806 (Utah App. 1998); and Bover v. Clark, 326 
Only two witnesses testified to gates on the Road prior to 
1998. Herb Troester testified that the Refuge put in a gate 
along the Road to keep cattle off the Refuge and Plaintiff 
Harmston testified that gates were put in during the 1950fs 
but those gates were removed by 1971 and replaced by cattle 
guards which control livestock but allow passage of the 
public. T. 282-284. The jury considered this evidence in 
its deliberations based on the Court's instructions, and 
determined that they did not change the use of the Road as a 
public way. 
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P.2d 107 (Utah 1958). Furthermore the facts do not support 
Chapman's argument. The facts showed that the Road was used 
every month of the year by numerous members of the public 
including oil field workers, government employees, hunters, 
sightseers, bird watchers and fisherman. 
The instruction given by the Court on continuous use of 
the Road was based on the law of this state and the verdict 
entered by the jury is supported by the facts on this issue. 
POINT V 
CHAPMANS PROVIDED NO FOUNDATION FOR THE 
INTRODUCTION OF PROPOSED EXHIBITS 4 AND 5. 
Chapmans, at the conclusion of Uintah County's evidence, 
informed the court that they would not be calling any 
witnesses. Chapmans' counsel then presented to the court two 
documents granting pipeline easements which documents were 
marked as Exhibits 4 and 5 and asked the court to receive 
those documents as evidence. T. 295-296 Chapman called no 
witness to identify the documents, to testify to their 
authenticity or to identify how the documents had relevance to 
the issue before the jury. The court received argument from 
counsel, pointed out to Chapman's counsel that he had the 
burden to lay a foundation for the documents and the burden to 
show the documents were relevant. T.303 The trial court then 
refused to receive the documents as exhibits pointing out that 
there was no testimony regarding the documents, nor any 
20 
evidence showing that any user of the Road was using the Road 
in connection with the pipeline easement and therefore no 
showing of relevancy. T. 306. 
It is a basic rule of evidence that for a document to be 
introduced there must be foundation provided and a showing 
that the document is relevant. Utah R. Evid. 401, 402 and 
901. Chapmans did nothing to meet their burden for the 
exhibits to be admitted. The court ruled correctly in not 
allowing the admission of those exhibits. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED CHAPMANS' REQUEST 
TO PLACE RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF THE ROAD AFTER 
THE JURY RENDERED ITS VERDICT BECAUSE THE REQUESTED 
RESTRICTIONS WERE NOT PLED NOR PRESENTED TO THE 
JURY. 
Chapmans' Amended Complaint did not request any 
restriction on the use of the Road. The parties, prior to the 
trial, stipulated to the width and location of the Road. R. 
116. Chapmans did not request any instructions to the jury, 
and the jury was not requested to decide, if there were 
restrictions on the use of the Road (Addendum 1) . Several days 
after the jury had entered its verdict, Chapman requested the 
court to restrict the size of vehicles that could use the 
Road. R. 1128. The court denied that motion as being untimely 
and not pled. R. 1139 (Addendum 6). 
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Generally, the width and use of the Road is determined to 
be that which is reasonably needed by the public. Jeremy v. 
Bertaanole, 116 P.2d 420, 423 (Utah 1941) and Kohler v. 
Martin, 916 P.2d 910, 914 (Utah App. 1996). Chapmans' 
arguments and cases based on prescriptive easement have no 
application to this case. In this case the parties stipulated 
to the Road's width and location prior to trial. R. 116. 
Neither party requested that the jury decide any other 
restrictions on the Road. R. 930. Therefore, no evidence was 
presented on that issue, the jury was not instructed on that 
issue and the jury did not enter a verdict on that issue. It 
would have been clear error for the trial court to have 
imposed the restrictions requested by Chapmans when that issue 
had never been pled nor presented to the jury. 
Additionally, once the jury determined that the Road was 
a public way, the restrictions on the size of the vehicles to 
use the public way would be governed by state statute. As 
long as the vehicle was within the legal size and weight 
restrictions for the public way, it could be operated on the 
Road. 
POINT VII 
UINTAH COUNTY SHOULD BE REIMBURSED FOR THE LEGAL 
FEES INCURRED ON APPEAL. 
Chapman's appeal is without merit in several respects 
including: 
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1) Chapmans refused to marshal the evidence in support 
of the jury verdict but rather picked and chose those facts 
that fit their theory of the case. 
2) Chapmans' request that the Court add owner consent 
as an element to prove a public road is clearly contrary to 
the language of the statute and case law, and is not based on 
a good faith extension of the law. 
3) Chapmans challenge two jury instructions (7 & 33), 
which were approved by Chapmans, is clearly without merit. 
4) Chapmans' objection to the trial court's refusal to 
allow documents for which no witness was called to testify 
about, or provide foundation for, is contrary to the most 
basic requirements of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
5) Chapman's request, after the jury verdict was 
rendered, to add restrictions to the use of the Road and then 
challenge the court's denial of that request, has no legal 
precedent. 
Rule 33 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure allow this 
Court to award fees for merit less appeals. Uintah County 
believes that the issues raised in the appeal against it 
qualifies as merit less. When the facts surrounding what was 
appealed, the state of the procedural posture of the issues 
appealed and the status of the law on those issues is 
considered, there is no reasonable basis to believe that 
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success on appeal was even probable. Uintah County requests 
the Court to award it fees in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Uintah County requests the Court to affirm the jury 
verdict, dismiss the appeal and award Uintah County the legal 
fees incurred on appeal. 
Dated this ("^  day of September, 2002. 
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED, 
McCLELtf% & TROTTER, P.C. 
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Arvada, CO 80002 
and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage 
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5) Jury Verdict 
6) Ruling dated 09/28/01 
7) Order and Judgment dated September 25, 2001 
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CLARK B ALLRED - 0055 
DONNA M. TROTTER - 8084 
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED, McCLELLAN & TROTTER, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
121 West Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (435) 789-4908 
MARK THOMAS 
deputy Uintah County Attorney 
152 E 100 N 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (435) 781-4356 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MILE CHAPMAN, ) 
) STIPULATION IN LIMINE 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF ) 
UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH, ) 
) Judge A. Lynn Payne 
Defendants. ) Civil No. 990800255 PR 
COMES NOW, the parties to the above-entitled matter and 
herewith enter into the following Stipulations In Limine governing 
the admissibility of evidence and/or legal argument in the trial of 
the within matter: 
1. The parties stipulate that the issue for jury 
determination in this proceeding is whether the road across 
Plaintiffs' properties in Sec 33, T7S, R21E and Sees. 4 and 5, T8S, 
R21E, SLM (Hereafter, "North Wyasket Bottom Road') has become a 
public highway pursuant to 72-5-104, U.C.A. 
2. The parties therefore stipulate and agree that evidence, 
both testimonial and documentary, regarding the classification of 
North Wyasket Bottom Road by Uintah County as a Utah Class B, Utah 
Class D and/or an RS 2477 Right-of-Way is not relevant to the issue 
and therefore shall be inadmissible under all circumstances of the 
trial. The parties shall so instruct their witnessed and counsel 
to avoid any breach of this stipulation. 
Signed and Submitted this /I day of \\,\UL.-LJ , 2001. 
McKEACHNIEv-ALLRED, 
McCLELLAN A TROTTER, P.C, 
Attorneys/fot Defendants 
A1 A 
/ J f 
« / ^ / 
1 .-I.- / './ 
Daniel S. Sam 



























the Supreme Court. 
MR. BECKWITH: Implicitly you had already ruled upon 
it. I merely needed to make an appropriate record. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BECKWITH: No. 7 had to do with the definition of 
thoroughfare, coming from Morris versus Blunt. The Court has 
accepted some of that language and rejected the rest, and 
rewritten its own instruction relative to thoroughfare. 
THE COURT: And you don't object to what we've done 
there? 
MR. BECKWITH: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BECKWITH: I've already preserved the objection 
relative to use under private right. Instruction No. 8 is the 
use 
ins 
of the road by the public. The Court has accepted this 
truction, although merged it into 










COURT: All right. So are you all 
BECKWITH: Yes. 
COURT: Since I've given 
BECKWITH: Yes. 
COURT: You're satisfied 
that? 
with that. 
BECKWITH: And then instruction No. 
The Court has rejected that. We 









1 homes or anything else out in this area except the old Louie 
2 Hall ranch and the Dutch Searles' ranch, which is no longer 
3 out there. Nobody lives out here. There are no commercial 
4 establishments such as stores, businesses, shopping malls 
5 that people need to get to. 
6 There are no oil and gas well activities that any oil 
7 service company has serviced in hauling in heavy equipment by 
8 semis or other larger rigs. Everything, if you believe the 
9 testimony, has been pick-up only, not the big rigs, because 
10 everybody has acknowledged there is a dugway north of the 
11 Fredrickson property, steep grade — Mr. Harmston has estimated 
12 it at 8 percent. That's a pretty steep grade -- twisting, and 
13 then you drop down. 
14 After 1974 the northern gate is removed. Then in 
15 comes Mr. Troester, and Mr. Troester becomes the manager of 
16 the refuge, and during his management until 1983 the refuge has 
17 installed a gate in Bull Durham Flats. You have to open that 
18 gate to get in, or to get through. That gate is across there. 
19 There has been no testimony that that gate was ever removed, or 
20 if it was, when it was removed. Mr. Troester then leaves, gets 
21 reassigned elsewhere and goes on other duties. 
22 After 1983 the evidence further shows that in 1998 
23 a gate was put across the road by Mr. Chapman. We know that 
24 that gate was locked because Mr. Chapman offered and gave to 
25 Mr. Aionso, which Mr. Alonso has admitted, gave him a key 
-357-
1 so that the refuge could come through. Other witnesses have 
2 described each of those gates and encountering those gates. 
3 Those gates interrupt continuity of use, and they interrupt 
4 ten years. 
5 MR. ALLRED: I'm going to object. That's not the law 
6 and the Court ought to instruct that there's nothing indicating 
7 that a gate there interrupts the use. There's no facts showing 
8 that it ever interrupted anybody's use and the law certainly 
9 (inaudible). 
10 MR. BECKWITH: Is Counsel arguing to the Court that the 
11 gate has to be locked? 
12 MR. ALLRED: There's no evidence indicating that — 
13 THE COURT: Well, there's no jury instruction on that 
14 particular part. 
15 MR. BECKWITH: Because there is no such law in Utah. 
16 THE COURT: Well, you surprised me. Let me excuse the 
17 jury for a minute. Are you fairly close to your closing 
18 argument? 
19 MR. BECKWITH: Just about. 
20 THE COURT: I'm concerned about the issue, but I don't 
21 want to interrupt your flow too much. 
22 MR. BECKWITH: And I would appreciate it. I didn't 
23 interrupt Mr. Allred's. 
24 THE COURT: Well, why don't you continue and then we 
25 may very well come back to that issue. 
INSTRUCTION NO.:- ; 3 
A road is a public road if the evidence established by clear and convincing evidence 
each of the following: 
1. Continuous use by the public 
2. As a public thoroughfare 
3. For a period of ten consecutive years 
If you find from the evidence that each of the foregoing elements has been proved by 
clear and convincing evidence, you should return a verdict that the road is a public road. If , 
on the other hand, you find that the evidence does not establish one or more of the above 
elements by clear and convincing evidence you should return a verdict that the road is not a 
public road. 
INSTRUCTION NO.: 
The term road includes any street, alley, lane, court or place. 
INSTRUCTION NO.: ^ 
Continuous use does not require that the public use the road constantly or that a large 
number of the public use the road. Even infrequent use is sufficient to prove a road was 
continuously used as a public thoroughfare. Continuous use is proven by clear and convincing 
evidence that members of the public have been able to use the road as often as they found it 
necessary or convenient. The use does not have to be for a particular purpose and can be for 
agriculture, recreational, business or any other purpose. 
INSTRUCTION NO.: XL 
A thoroughfare is a place or way through which there is a passing or travel. It becomes 
a public thoroughfare when the public has a general right of passage. Even though property 
over which the road passes is privately owned, a road will be deemed dedicated or abandoned 
to public use when the public has continuously used a thoroughfare for a period of 10 years. 
Nevertheless, the use must be by the public at large. Use by adjoining land owners or 
their employees (in connection with their employment) is not considered to be use by the 
public. 
INSTRUCTION NO.: •'' f 
Once it has been established that a road has been continuously used by the public as a 
public thoroughfare for more than 10 years, the road is a public road and will continue to be a 
public road until the road is abandoned or vacated by order of the highway authority having 
jurisdiction over the roadway, or by other competent authority. 
INSTRUCTION NO.: ;.? 
A road which is established through continuous use is established through its use by the 
public over 10 years as a public thoroughfare. Under such circumstances, the land owner is 
deemed to have dedicated or abandoned the roadway for the use of the public as a public 
road. The landlord is not entitled to compensation for the roadway nor is the County under 
any obligation to pay the owner for the use of the land 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NILE CHAPMAN, Et.AL, SPECIAL VERDICT 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UINTAH COUNTY, Case No.: 990800255 
Defendant. 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions: 
1. Do you find that the road at issue in this proceeding is a public road? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
2. If your answer to Question No.l is "Yes", then specify the consecutive years in 
which the road in issue in this proceeding was used by the public. 
ANSWER: H (g 0 ^ { ^ l 
DATED this day of September, 2001. 
\c £ Foreperson 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NILE CHAPMAN, ROGER CHAPMAN, 
and GORDON HARMSTON, TRUSTEE 
OF THE EUGENE HARMSTON 
TRUST, 
Plaintiffs, 
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UINTAH COUNTY, Case No.: 990800255 
Defendant. 
The Court has reviewed the proposed orders which have been submitted by the parties. 
The issue at trial was whether the road was a public road. The jury was not asked to decide 
and did not decide whether there was any limit on the type of vehicle which could use the 
road. Therefore, the Court has signed the Order submitted by Defendants. 
DATED this i ? day of September, 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
A. LYNN PA DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTD7ICATE 
I hereby certify that on t he^ y fo*, day of September, 2001, true and correct copies of 
the Ruling were mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered to: Mr. James A. Beckwith, 
Attorney at Law, at 7910 Ralston Road, Suite 7, Arvada, CO 80002, Mr. Daniel S. Sam, 
Attorney at Law, at: 319 W. 100 S., Vernal, UT 84078, Mr. Clark A. Allred, Attorney at 
Law, at 121 W. Main Street, Vernal, UT 84078, and to Mr. G. Mark Thomas, Deputy Uintah 
County Attorney, at 152 E. 100 N., Vernal, UT 84078. 
ENTRY 20Q1Q066BS 
BOOK 775 P r t G E 4 - 6 6 
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/u., 
CLARK B ALLRED - 005 5 
DONNA M. TROTTER - 8 08 4 
McKEACHNIE, ALLRED, McCLELLAN & TROTTER, 
Attorneys for Defendant, Uintah County 
121 West Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (435) 789-4908 
MARK THOMAS 
Deputy Uintah County Attorney 
152 E 100 N 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (435) 781-4356 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
E N T R Y 20010066SS 
STATE OF UTAH SOOK 775 PAGE 466-**f *0.GG 
G5-0CT-Q1 045GO 
RANDY SIMMONS 
NILE CHAPMAN, ROGER CHAPMAN 
and GORDON KARMSTON, TRUSTEE 




RECORDER> UINTAH COUNTY* UTAH 
MCKEACHNIE ALLRED HCCLELLAN & TR0TT 
121 WEST HAIN 
REG B Y : SYLENE ACCUTT0R00P , DEPUTY 
ORDER AND 
JUDGMENT 
C i v i l No. 9 9 0 8 0 0 2 5 5 
• Jud^e : A. Lynn P a y n e 
D e f e n d a n t 
The above captioned matter came before the Court for a jury 
trial on September 4 and 5, 2001. The parties having presented 
their evidence and argued the matter to the jury and the jury 
having been instructed and having entered its verdict finding that 
the road was a public road and had been from 1960 through 1998 and 
based en that verdict, the Court orders- as follows: 
ENTRY 2001006688 
BOOK 775 P A G E -4-67 
1. The road identified as the North Wyasket Bottom Road as 
it crosses the real properties owned by the Plaintiffs in Section 
33, Township 7 South, Range 21 East, Salt Lake Meridian and Section 
4, Township 8 South, Range 21 East, Salt Lake Meridian is a public 
road pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated §72-5-104. 
2. The Plaintiffs are enjoined from interfering with the 
public's use of the road as it crosses their real property. 
3. Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, the width of 
the road where it crosses the Plaintiffs' properties shall be 
twelve feet and shall follow its historic course except as set 
forth on the attached map. 
DATED this i 5 day of September, 2001. 
A. Lynn Payne 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
James A. Beckwith 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
t:\Uintah County-Chapman\order and judgment 
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